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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Research in systems engineering has focused on dependability for more than three
decades. Due to industry standards and maturing production processes, hardware has be-
come increasingly more reliable. Therefore software dependability has become the most
crucial element for overall system dependability.
The goal of dependability research is to provide means for software development that
not only ensure correct function but also reliability, security and availability [1]. As systems
increase in complexity, the challenges of making a system dependable and especially fault-
tolerant concurrently increase.
This is particularly true for distributed real-time and embedded (DRE) systems, such as
traffic control systems, weather observation systems, total shipboard computing or highly
automated assembly lines. These systems are characterized by limited resources, including
space, energy consumption, memory size, CPU capacity and network bandwidth. Since
they always include physical elements and require timely interaction with physical pro-
cesses, they require diverse quality of service (QoS) guarantees, such as timely delivery of
data, limited usage of processing resources or high availability. Fault-tolerance is one as-
pect of QoS requirements that gains more importance as DRE systems are used in mission
critical scenarios with high dependability requirements.
A recent position paper [13] makes clear that despite many efforts in research, the
main reasons for system crashes and downtime are problems related to dependability and
fault-tolerance mechanisms fail to work correctly. The key to comprehensive system de-
pendability lies in moving from point solutions for specific scenarios towards dependability
engineering that integrates all aspects through well understood models, metrics, develop-
ment processes and tools.
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This thesis proposes the use of component-based software development techniques
to improve fault-tolerance in DRE systems. Two frameworks are presented that capture
different aspects of fault-tolerance. Components with HEterogeneous State Synchroniza-
tion (CHESS), applies the strategy pattern to provide automated synchronization mech-
anisms for internal component state. CHESS integrates with the second framework that
provides replication and failover capabilities on the abstraction level of components and
groups of components. This framework is called COmponent Replication based on Failover
Units (CORFU) and allows for standardized approach to fault-tolerance with a high level
of transparency to the component developer.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter ?? gives an overview
of the background on research in fault-tolerance middleware. A summary of the basic
principles for our work in chapter III. Based on this chapter IV presents the concepts
and architecture of CHESS. CORFU as the main contribution of this thesis is motivated
and described in chapter V. Chapter VI evaluates our proposed solutions qualitatively and
quantitatively. Concluding remarks in chapter VII summarize the accomplished results and
point out future work.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
Dependability and fault-tolerance have been the focus of extensive research in applica-
tion and system development. This section gives an overview of the efforts in three areas
that are closely related to the work of this thesis. These areas are
1. dependency analysis for fault correlation
2. frameworks for fault-tolerance
3. modeling dependability aspects
II.1 Dependency Analysis for Fault Correlation
A major challenge for effective failure handling is to gain comprehensive knowledge
about which parts of a system are affected by a system fault. Faults cannot detected directly
but only through the resulting errors they cause. Pinpointing the causing fault allow rea-
soning about system parts that are affected by the original fault. This allows fast reaction
to errors before they can cause subsequent errors in other parts of the system.
Gaining knowledge about error propagation dependencies between system elements is
therefore crucial for dependable systems. This information can be used to determine which
system parts will eventually be compromised. This enables comprehensive failure handling
as opposed to reactive approaches that only monitoring for the basic elements of the system.
Research on fault dependencies has taken different paths to gather and apply such
knowledge. These approaches can be categorized into static approaches and observation
based approaches.
Viera et al present an approach [15] that automates dependency analysis in component-
based systems. The Component Based Dependency Model allows the incorporation of
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diverse types of dependencies that are categorized into intra-component dependencies that
define execution and error propagation paths within one component implementation and
external dependencies that defined dependencies to other component or hardware and soft-
ware infrastructure elements. The strength of this approach is that it includes different
sources of information about the system, such as deployment information, additional com-
ponent meta-data and meta-data about component connection. This approach is static in its
nature since it builds its dependency information based on meta-data. It therefore cannot
react on unforeseen failures or error propagation paths.
The static approach can be applied to various domains of component models. Another
example of this is event correlation [7] in the domain of event based systems, where depen-
dencies between different event sources are used to identify the original fault.
To address the limitations of static dependency information the Automatic Failure-Path
Inference [5] approach relies on system behavior analysis at run-time. It focuses on com-
ponent based web applications implemented in Java and assumes that errors that express
themselves as exceptions. Fault dependencies are captured as a directed graph, called
failure-propagation map. This graph is populated through direct interaction with the sys-
tem. Fault injection and monitoring of resulting component crashes is used to built up an
initial graph for a system. Later this graph is corrected based on non-intrusive monitoring
of the system under nominal operation. While this approach is very flexible in adopting the
dependency information to the system it is limited in its support of different fault types due
to its focus on exceptions and the Java programming language.
This work on dependency analysis relates to our research as it provides methodologies
to define groups of depended components. These groups serve as input for the algorithms
and mechanisms as described in chapter V.
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II.2 Frameworks for Fault-Tolerance
In general a framework for tault-tolerance integrates different aspects of dependability.
The role of frameworks mainly is to enable tault-tolerance, which includes error detec-
tion, fault diagnosis, fault isolation, error recovery and system reconfiguration. However
other means of dependability, such as fault-prevention fault removal and fault forecasting
benefit from frameworks as well. The coverage of different tault-tolerance means by dif-
ferent frameworks as well as their domain scope vary widely. To outline different existing
approaches they are compare and contrasted with our solution approach here. The consid-
ered frameworks are Adaptive Quality of Service for Availability (AQuA) and JBoss with
Application-Generic Recovery (JAGR).
AQuA [12], an adaptive architecture for dependable distributed objects focuses on
providing redundancy for distributed objects. AQuA objects are contained in replication
groups that provide a variety of replication schemes realized by a message based group
communication mechanism. AQuA uses CORBA to define and implement objects, but
maps them to the underlying group communication mechanism. The mapping layer in-
cludes mechanisms for error detection and failover. The Fault model includes process fail-
ures, detected through heartbeat messages and data value failures. A central dependability
manager coordinates groups and manages the fault tolerance infrastructure.
AQuA supports tault-tolerance on the granularity of objects, while component-based
systems often need additional levels of granularity. Components themselves can be com-
prised of objects and dependencies between components can result in their need to failover
together. component-based frameworks go beyond the general framework approach by
also defining a component life-cycle and development process that allows to formalize as-
pects of other dependability means like fault prevention through offline analysis or defined
methodologies for fault removal and system validation.
JAGR [4] builds on a component-based infrastructure for the domain of three tier web
5
applications with permanent data storage. JAGR focuses on intelligent failover mechanisms
based on dependency information gained through automatic failure path interference as
described earlier. Its main components are a modular monitoring structure that allows to
plug in different monitors for different error types. An intelligent recovery manager gathers
this information and applies micro-reboots to restart parts of the system that are affected.
Based on the result it can escalate the reboot scope from single components to the whole
system.
In distributed real-time and embedded systems however, persistent data storage and
stateless components cannot be applied in all cases due to limited storage and processing
resources. Our approach will therefore take into account state replication of groups of
replicated components and therefore provide failover mechanisms as a major mean for
fault tolerance instead of micro-reboots.
II.3 Modeling Dependability Aspects
A component-based framework that targets DRE systems is Cadena [8]. Cadena fo-
cuses on the modeling of component behavior early in the design process based on property
specifications capture high-level component information. This includes inter-dependencies
to ports of other components and intra-dependencies that capture relationships between
ports of the same component. Properties also capture behavioral specifications that allow
reasoning of temporal behavior and control-flows within components. Based on this infor-
mation, interface definitions and assembly descriptions, a system model can be constructed
to allow reason on various system aspects, such as event rate assignment, traffic optimized
component distribution and schedulability analysis. Cadena not only encompasses a run-
time framework, but also a domain specific modeling tool suite for system modeling and a
simulation environment for model verification.
MDDPro[14] focuses on modeling dependability QoS requirements more explicitly. It
is designed to be a domain specific modeling language that provides an orthogonal view to
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the deployment structure of a system and allows the annotation of tault-tolerance attributes
to components. It introduces three concepts to explicitly model component replication:
1. Failover units annotate that a group of system entities fails if any one element of it
fails. Different parameters can be defined on the group that characterize the kind of
failure recovery strategy used (e.g. number of replicas, heartbeat frequency, etc.).
2. Replication groups allow to formally declare, which components replicate the same
logical object. Replication groups allow to configure state synchronization policies.
3. Shared risk groups are a way to model how likely it is that a failure propagates from
one processing node to other nodes. This is realized as a tree where edges represent
neighboring nodes and distances in number of edges serve as a measure for how
likely a failure is to propagate.
MDDPro provides placement algorithms that automatically add component replicas
based on those entities above and provides model interpreters for generative programming
of deployment meta-data in XML format.
Our work on run-time support for component dependability is complementary to both
of the approaches of Cadena and MDDPro since it provides run-time support for the mod-
eling concepts. Chapter V describes CORFU, a framework for failover behavior for groups
of components and chapter IV describes CHESS, a framework for automated state syn-
chronization within replication groups.
7
CHAPTER III
BASIC DESIGN CONCEPTS
III.1 Fault Model
The underlying fault model for the work presented here includes detection of host fail-
ures and process failures. A host is a physical unit of processing that is connected to the
system through a network and has an operating system. A process is located on a spe-
cific host and performs system functionality in a separate address space. It is furthermore
assumed that hosts as well as processes show fail-stop behavior. This means that any occur-
ring error leads to immediate shutdown of the entity. Due to the resource constraints posed
by DRE systems only passive replication is considered, where only one primary replica is
actively processing requests, while backup replicas are activated in the case of a failover as
opposed to active replication that consumes more processing and networking resources.
III.2 Architectural Foundations
The prototype for a dependable component framework is based on the OMG lightweight
CORBA component model specification. However the design structure of the services and
mechanisms described can be easily implemented on any other component framework with
mightiness. We will therefore first give an overview of the central concepts of CCM.
For the proposed architecture we furthermore take a layered approach: As CCM builds
on the CORBA specification that provides object level abstraction in a distributed system,
we leverage the capabilities of earlier research on fault tolerance on CORBA objects with
real time requirements. Thus the second part of this section describes the capabilities of
FLARE, a Fault-tolerant Lightweight Adaptive Real-time Middleware for Distributed Real-
time and Embedded Systems [3]. Based on these concepts we then develop the architecture
of a component based fault tolerance mechanism.
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III.2.1 The FLARe Real-Time Fault-Tolerance Framework
FLARe provides “lightweight fault tolerance” for CORBA objects. It combines several
concepts and services to allow the definition of replication groups per object, a mechanism
for failure detection and means to allow backup replica to seamlessly take over request
processing of failed objects.
FLARes design also minimizes direct coupling with application code, so that its mech-
anisms provide fault tolerance as transparently as possible. FLARE entities can be cate-
gorized by their location within a system. We distinguish client side entities, server side
entities and middleware services.
The server side entities enable the grouping of replica objects on different machines or
processes to be treated as one logical entity. FLARE provides replication on the granularity
of objects but detects process level failures since it is very unlikely that an object within a
project crashes without affecting the complete process and taking it down with it. To deter-
mine process crashes, each server side application includes a separate monitor thread that
uses a TCP/IP socket to allow a monitoring service to observe the liveliness of the process.
The server also includes registration functionality for the monitoring service and a central
ReplicationManager, which both are described later. FLARE also provides a generic state
synchronization mechanism, that requires application to provide callback methods that can
insert and extract their internal state into and from a CORBA Any type. A state synchro-
nization agent in the server process is responsible for retrieving and distributing the server
object state. This is done by one agent for all the objects hosted in one process. To associate
hosted objects with a replicated group of objects, a server side interceptor adds a tagged
component with the name of the replica object group to each IOR that belongs to a locally
hosted servant.
The client side entities allow seamless failover and failure detection. Using CORBAs
interoperable interceptor framework, an interceptor for exceptions is used to detect com-
munication failures. If an exception is detected, the interceptor consults the second entity
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deployed on the client side: The forwarding agent keeps an up-to-date list of all the rele-
vant object groups of a system and can therefore pass an object reference of the next replica
for the failed object. The information about the object group, the failed reference belongs
to is extracted from the IOR of the object as described in the server side mechanisms of
FLARE. The client interceptor then uses the CORBA LOCATION_FORWARD exception
mechanism to transparently redirect the clients request to a working backup replica.
The FLARE middleware services include a replication manager (RM) and host mon-
itors. Both services are have an IDL interface and are implemented as CORBA Object
Services. The host monitors responsibility is to detect process level failures. For this
purpose one host monitor service is deployed on each network node that hosts server pro-
cesses. Each server process needs to register itself with the host monitor and open a socket
connection that can be monitored. All host monitors register themselves with the RM and
send periodic updates about the host machine status to the replication. These update mes-
sages also serve as heartbeats to allow the RM to detect if a host is unreachable. The RM
itself is the central entity that keeps all the information about active replicas and their lo-
cation as well as the status of all host machines. It periodically builds up-to-date lists (so
called RankLists) of object references belonging to one replica group and their failover
order. These lists are then sent to every client forwarding agent and every server state
synchronization agent to provide them with the necessary information for failover or state
synchronization respectively. The RM itself can be replicated using the same mechanism
as any other server object to avoid it being a single point of failure.
FLARE allows very time efficient failovers since every client has a local copy of failover
targets and can use built-in ORB features to perform failovers transparently to the appli-
cation logic. The second strength of FLARE is its ability to react to changes in system
performance by implementing algorithms within the RM that sort the rank lists according
to available system resource at the time of failure detection. This allows to choose backup
replicas on the least loaded host to take over and therefore avoid performance overloads
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due to failures. By providing an abstraction for a group of replicated objects FLARE lends
itself as a basis for higher-level abstractions of fault tolerance as we will describe in the
following section.
III.2.2 The CORBA Component Model
The CORBA Component Model (CCM) provides a framework for software compo-
nents that are reusable in different contexts, without the need to recompile or adapt them
due to changes of the infrastructure or other aspects unrelated to application logic.
CCM components and ports. CCM extends the CORBA Interface Definition Lan-
guage (IDL) to support the definition of components. CORBA Components can expose
services through so called ports that are defined in IDL. Ports provide a structured way for
components to interact. Ports can either provide services or indicate that the component
uses the service of another component. Different port types allow for either synchronous
or asynchronous communication.
The CCM container model. The process of developing CCM components is sup-
ported by code generation tools. The structure of component implementations and facto-
ries for component creation, called homes, are defined by the Component Implementation
Definition Language (CIDL). A CIDL compiler generates code that integrates executor
code written by component developers into the CCM run-time middleware. The actual
implementation of a component is called executor and accesses the run-time through spe-
cial interface. At the heart of this integration is the CCM container. A container provides
the run-time environment for one or more component implementations and consists of the
following two parts:
• Obligations that component developers must implement, such as life-cycle methods
(e.g., ccm_activate(), ccm_passivate(), and ccm_remove()), sup-
port for provided ports (i.e., facets and event sinks), and configuration through at-
tribute setter and getter methods.
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• Obligations that must be implemented by the CCM middleware, such as context
information that component developers can use to access middleware services, such
as persistence, event notification, and fault-tolerance. Likewise, all required ports
(i.e., receptacles and event sources) can be accessed here.
Component servers. Components implementations are compiled into libraries and
then packaged together with meta-data. On system deployment, components are loaded
into a processes that provides the container interface. All customization to the specific
run-time is done by configuration attributes and by selecting the appropriate component
implementation. The process that hosts components is called component server. Compo-
nent servers are started by started by deployment tools that are described in the following
section.
III.2.3 The OMG Deployment and Configuration Specification
In addition to the specification for CORBA components, the OMG also specified the
Deployment and Configuration (D&C) specification [9] that standardizes data structures
and interfaces for component meta-data and component deployment functionality. Al-
though it can be used to deploy CORBA components it is designed to be independent
of any concrete component model and can be used to deploy other types of components.
The D&C specification is segmented, containing data models, run-time interfaces and
tool specifications for the three phases of component software development, target system
definition and execution of a component system.
We will focus on the data and management model for system execution.
Data Model: The central model for how a system is structured is the deployment plan.
It contains information about which component implementations and corresponding arti-
facts are used and which component instances are present in the system. Each of these
entities can also contain configuration properties that allows tailoring of components to the
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specific deployment. The target infrastructure is represented in form of nodes, that repre-
sent server machines that a component instance will run on. Each instance is associated
with a node to run on. As mentioned earlier components interact with each other through
ports. The deployment plan captures component interdependecies through connections.
Each connection contains two references to component ports, where one reference is point
to a port that provides a service and the other reference points to a port that requires a ser-
vice. Connections to interfaces outside of the current deployment plan are realized through
external references that allow to specify a CORBA object reference URL to identify the
provided or used service.
Management Model: All management entities are defined by their interfaces which
contain methods and attributes. The central entity is the ExecutionManager which is re-
sponsible for instantiating DomainApplications defined as deployment plans. Every node
is represented by a NodeManager in the management layer. For each deployment plan it
will create a DomainApplicationManager that is the administration interface to start and
stop the application. It will split a deployment plan into partial deployment plans and each
NodeManager will process these plans. Each node deployment plan will be represented by
a NodeApplicationManager that acts on the local level as the DomainApplicationManager
on the global level and allows to start and stop NodeApplications.
Figure III.1: Component Based Mission Control System
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Figure III.1 shows the interaction patterns between management entities. The Plan-
Launcher does not belong to the management model but is a deployment tool used to read
in a deployment plan, pass it to the execution manager and guide the system start-up pro-
cess.
14
CHAPTER IV
COMPONENTS WITH HETEROGENEOUS STATE SYNCHRONIZATION
IV.1 Problem Statement
Passive replication schemes depend on backup replicas that can take over processing
quickly when a failure occurs. This includes deployment of backup instances of the same
application and then failover when an error is detected. In addition to that replicas need to
be synchronized frequently when they are not stateless. Applications in general and com-
ponent instances in particular contain internal state. This state can change through client
invocations. It is also possible that other elements in the system, such as time triggered
events can modify internal state.
Active replication schemes do not necessarily need to keep replicas synchronized since
all replicas process the same incoming requests and change their state accordingly. How-
ever even active replication only can ensure this in deterministic applications, where a
certain input results in the same internal state every time. It also cannot be applied if state
can change due to external events that are not captured by the fault-tolerance mechanism,
e.g. process mutexes or shared memory as described in [11, section 3.5].
CHESS focuses on passive replication schemes. Due to changing internal state compo-
nent replicas need to exchange information about their state to preserve consistency. State
consistency is required for replicas to take over immediately on error occurrence. A com-
mon technique for state synchronization is the check-pointing approach: all relevant state
information of an application is gathered and captured in form of a snapshot (i.e. struc-
tured data or memory dumps). There are different approaches for the timing on snapshots:
While a time triggered approaches define an interval after which a new snapshot is taken,
event triggered approaches take snapshots based on notifications from the application of
system infrastructure that state changes have occurred. Depending on the replication style
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snapshots are directly distributed to all replicas through dedicated communication mecha-
nisms like multicast messages (warm passive) or they are stored in a central repository and
transferred to the replica only prior to a fail-over (cold passive).
Providing a generic mechanism for state replication is a challenging task due to the wide
range of differences in how application state can look like. To design such a mechanism
means therefore to trade-off different characteristics of internal application state. This state
can be categorized across different dimensions that will serve as criteria to evaluate the
state synchronization mechanism of CHESS.
1. The Location of state in relation to the component implementation is a crucial as-
pect and limitation for application generic approaches to state replication. The most
common case is state internal to the application, being captured in local variables,
members of classes that implement the component or component attributes. How-
ever in complex DRE systems it is possible that components access system resources
or middleware infrastructures (e.g. a database persistency layer) which is external
state. A special case of external state is shared state where several components use a
system resource (e.g. shared memory) together. Simply including external and espe-
cially shared state into the snapshot would lead to duplicates and merging conflicts
in the replicas and has therefore been given careful design consideration.
2. The Size of the internal application state can vary greatly. On the one side of the
spectrum there are stateless applications that have no state that needs to be preserved
from invocation to invocation. Other components keep state information that is com-
paratively small (e.g. configuration values or counters). In other application domains
state data includes large amounts of data (e.g. received streaming data, multimedia
content, in-memory databases).
3. Complexity and Distribution are two tightly coupled properties of application state
information. The term distribution tries to capture the fact that the application can
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contain very different types of state that are not stored within a single data structure
but rather are distributed throughout the application structure. The greater the degree
of distribution the harder and more time consuming it is to create a snapshot or to
restore state from a snapshot. This also applies for complexity: On the one hand
there are very simple data structures like basic types that are very easily copied to
or extracted from a snapshot. As the complexity increases for sequential containers
like errors or lists of items, these operations get more time consuming. Associative
containers and structures with arbitrary member data types and big hierarchical depth
have even higher performance costs for snapshot creation.
4. Dynamics of Changes: Not only the form of state differs greatly from application to
application, but also the frequency by which state is altered and needs to be check-
pointed. Some applications alter and store their state only once at initialization. Other
applications undergo many state changes in their lifetime. These changes can occur
due to external input or internal mechanisms like time-triggered events. Many ap-
plications change their state based on incoming requests. Depending on the system
characteristics this can happen very rarely (e.g. in applications only used for main-
tenance) or with a high rate of invocations in the range of microseconds (e.g. for
streaming of satellite telemetry data). A generic replication mechanism like CHESS,
therefore needs to offer the flexibility to specify at which timing characteristics need
to be ensured for state synchronization.
We present the architecture of CHESS by presenting three design challenges that origin
from the diversity of state characteristics. These challenges are:
1. providing a common interface for exchanging diverse state snapshots
2. satisfying varying timing requirements
3. support for different protocols for state dissemination
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i n t e r f a c e R e p l i c a t e d A p p l i c a t i o n
{
v o id s e t _ s t a t e ( i n any s t a t e _ v a l u e ) ;
any g e t _ s t a t e ( ) ;
} ;
Figure IV.1: Callback interface for state replication
IV.2 Providing a Common Interface for Exchanging Diverse State Snapshots
Challenge: As described earlier the structure and complexity of state snapshots varies
greatly and in general is tightly coupled to an applications’ implementation. It is therefore
impossible to design an interface through which state snapshots are passed as strongly typed
parameters. First generation distributed systems tended to solve this problem by passing
simple byte streams and leaving the complex challenges of marshaling and demarshaling
as well as type checking and alignment adaptions to the application developer.
Solution: Pass state snapshot as CORBA Any. To achieve platform and language
neutrality for the state extraction mechanism and integration the necessary interfaces are
declared in CORBAs interface definition language (IDL). IDL defines a special basic type
any that allows dynamic insertion of any data type and still preserves type-safety through
type code annotation and support for type checking, marshaling and demarshaling.
This allows to separate different obligations in the process of state distribution: The
application itself has to perform the insertion operation of its internal state into an any
object and also the extraction operation to retrieve new state instances from an any value.
The middleware can then distribute the Any value transparently without needing to have
additional knowledge about the internal structure of the snapshot. CORBA Anys can only
contain data defined in IDL.The application developer is responsible for declaration of an
IDL data type that represents the complete state, so that it can be inserted into an any
data-type.
Figure IV.1 shows the obligations of an application to make its internal state available
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to the state synchronization mechanism. An application has to implement these methods
to interact with the state synchronization mechanism. If the framework needs to extract
state from an application that is a primary replica, it will call get_state(). All backup
replicas will receive state updates through the set_state() method.
Evaluation: This approaches’ main strength is that it addresses the dimension of com-
plexity and distribution by allowing the separation of concerns. It shields the generic mech-
anism from the internal structure of the application state but also supports the application
developer by using the CORBA Any data type that provides extraction and insertion op-
erators and therefore simplifies the gathering and composition of a state snapshot. The
dimension of size has a strong influence on the performance of this approach: Transmitting
any data has a certain overhead since type information has to be embedded on the sender
side and extracted on the receiver side. Dealing with the location dimension of state is left
to the application developer who has to solve the problem how to deal with shared state
without any framework support. This particular aspect of the solution does not address the
dimension of the dynamics of changes.
IV.3 Satisfying varying Timing Requirements
Challenge: Applications may have very different requirements for when snapshots
shall be distributed from the primary replica to backup replicas. There are two main types
of timing behavior: (1) cyclic timing where state is updated based on a given time interval
and (2) acyclic timing where specific events like a client request trigger state synchroniza-
tion. Middleware mechanisms can automatically determine when to disseminate state for
cyclic timing behavior and therefore use the get_state() and set_state()methods
as callback methods to automate the process. However since the timing cannot be predicted
in the second case it needs active involvement of applications to disseminate state at the
right time. Combining both cases into a general framework mechanism is needed to ease
the burden of the application developer without restricting timing schemes.
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Figure IV.2: State transmission sequence based on a common interface
Solution: Separation of concerns between triggering state synchronization and state
retrieval allows to treat both cases in a uniform way. This approach includes several steps of
interaction between an application and a StateSynchronizationAgent which is a middleware
agent for state synchronization. Each process containing CHESS object replicas also hosts
a StateSynchronizationAgent that is responsible for all replication related functionality and
therefore removes this obligation from the application developer.
The sequence of interactions as described in figure IV.2 provides a mechanism for flex-
ible and generic state dissemination.
1. Registration of components with the StateSynchronizationAgent through a unique
application id allows the manager to retrieve state from the application when needed.
The registration needs to be done during the start-up phase of the component.
2. The StateSynchronizationAgent exposes the interface method state_changed
(in string id) that allows the component to indicate a change of its internal
state has. This then triggers state synchronization. The id parameter is needed by the
agent to identify the component amongst all locally deployed components managed
by this agent.
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3. It is the agents responsibility to react on the notification about a state change and
retrieve the component state from the component that issued the notification. This is
done by calling back the get_state() method described earlier.
4. As the final step the StateSynchronizationAgent will then distribute component state
to backup replicas in form of a CORBA Any instance.
Evaluation: This solution mainly addresses the dimension of dynamics of changes.
CHESS makes triggering of state synchronization the responsibility of the application de-
veloper. The trade-off for this approach is additional effort for the developer to issue the
change notifications whenever they are necessary. On the other hand this gives great flex-
ibility in controlling which application state changes really require state synchronization.
This allows for the most efficient usage of resources, since updates are only performed if
they are necessary. Through the separation of concerns between state change notification
and the actual execution of the state dissemination the effort for the developer is greatly re-
duced. CHESS shields the replica implementation from the actual distribution of snapshot
data to backup replicas.
IV.4 Support for Different Protocols for State Dissemination
Challenge: There is no one-size-fits-all communication mechanism to disseminate
state. Depending on size and timing requirements and the scheme of state dissemination,
different communication mechanisms are needed to provide optimal performance. Small
snapshots of applications with high reliability requirements need to be transferred through
synchronous peer-to-peer protocols with error correction capabilities. Larger snapshots, es-
pecially when transmitted to a large number of replicas need efficient protocols like group
communication protocols and multicast messages. In systems with cold passive semantics
where replicas only need to update their state in a failure case a central persistent stor-
age solution for state storage and retrieval is more adequate. Directly encoding the type of
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communication mechanism into the applications’ implementation results in a tight coupling
between business logic and transport mechanism and therefore complicates development
and adaption of the application.
Solution: Applying the Strategy pattern. CHESS uses the strategy pattern [6, pp.315f]
to allow applications a flexible choice of the used protocol at run-time. The state dissemina-
tion mechanism is represented by an object interface that provides a generic way to access
all variants of state dissemination in the same way. This pattern can be applied to shield
the component developer from the concrete protocol for state dissemination. In this way
the functionality can be integrated into the StateSynchronizationAgent. On replica regis-
tration the application can set a policy to determine which mechanism will be used by the
agent. The agent then will instantiate the appropriate concrete strategy object instance and
associate it with the application to use with every dissemination of state information.
Figure IV.3 shows how the strategy pattern was applied in CHESS to support two differ-
ent communication mechanisms. These are synchronous CORBA calls and multicast com-
munication based on OMGs Data Distribution Service (DDS). The design of CHESS easily
allows to extend the framework by additional communication protocols, e.g. message-
based mechanisms or database storage. The abstract strategy interface benefits from the
earlier design decision to use the CORBA Any data type to represent snapshots. This re-
duces the complexity of the interface methods. However is also creates the necessity to
extract the data from the any object and transform it into the appropriate form in each
concrete strategy class. One example for this is shown in case of DDS communication.
The design above allows for choosing a communication mechanism choice for each
replica within the process. At registration time the StateSynchronizationAgent will create
the appropriate concrete strategy based on a registration parameter. When the application
later notifies it about state changes the agent will pass the state to the appropriate object
using the ReplicationStrategy interface.
Evaluation: CHESS flexible mechanism for heterogeneous protocols addresses the
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Figure IV.3: The strategy pattern applied to state synchronization
dimensions of size, complexity and change dynamics. It allows to transparently apply pro-
tocols suited for particular state characteristics. This flexibility enables trade-offs between
the following aspects:
1. Short delivery times need to be ensured for components with high update rates where
the dimension of change dynamics is important. However with growing size and
complexity of state snapshots it is harder to provide short delivery times. Connection
oriented protocols are well suited for fast delivery of small amounts of data.
2. High network throughput is necessary for snapshots with large sizes. However timely
delivery can suffer from protocols that maximize throughput. Group communication
mechanisms are well suited for sending large state to several receivers.
3. Reliable delivery is needed in systems were state consistency has to be guaranteed
under all circumstances. This usually is done through error correction codes and
retransmission of lost packets. Therefore trade-offs have to be made between efficient
and reliable delivery protocols.
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The strategy pattern allows to make these trade-offs on a per component basis and
therefore accounts for heterogeneous environments and systems with highly diverse state
characteristics per component.
24
CHAPTER V
COMPONENT REPLICATION BASED ON FAILOVER UNITS
Conventional middleware solutions provide fault tolerance through replication and re-
covery on the granularity level of single objects, processes and servers. Component mid-
dleware requires failover mechanisms at a higher level of granularity. The compositional
nature of component applications often results in dependencies between components that
require a coordinated failover mechanism for groups of components distributed across
several servers and processes. This chapter presents CORFU, a middleware architec-
ture for component-based fault-tolerance that includes support for single-component fault-
tolerance and uses it as a base for providing fault-tolerance on the level of groups of com-
ponents.
V.1 Case Study
The domain of space systems is one that has especially strong requirements for real-
timeliness as well as for dependability. To illustrate the challenges that arise from component-
based DRE systems we describe the structure of a possible Mission Control System (MCS)
as used by the European Space Agency [10].
The purpose of an MCS is to control one or multiple satellites that perform a mission
in space that is dedicated to a specific task, such as earth observation or deep-space ex-
ploration. A MCS processes data gathered by the satellites and controls satellites. It is
deployed in a central control station and communicates with a network of ground stations
that provide communication links to the satellites.
Figure V.1 shows the structure of a component-based MCS. As time windows for active
connections to satellites can be very short due to their orbit and visibility to ground stations,
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Figure V.1: Component-Based Mission Control System
availability of the MCS during such phases is crucial. All MCS are therefore laid out re-
dundantly in hardware as well as in software functionality. Each of the entities is deployed
twice and some are grouped into chains of functionality that are groups of components
working closely together.
The Network Interface System (NIS) serves as a gateway from the ground stations to
the MCS through a wide area network. Using a special protocol, the space link extension
protocol, it processes and transmits all mission relevant data to and from the MCS. This
includes sending telecommand data that controls the satellites and receiving telemetry data
from the satellites. The NIS itself is not part of a MCS chain, but is laid out redundantly.
Hardware and software of a NIS are tightly coupled and therefore replicated together. In
case of NIS failure a chain can switch from the active NIS A to NIS B in a warm passive
failover.
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The telemetry server analyses telemetry data and preprocesses it for the mission oper-
ators. The archive stores telemetry data permanently and is fed by the Telemetry server.
The telecommand server is responsible for creating and sending new commands issued by
the mission operators. A MCS needs to be tailored to specific missions and reconfigured
for different mission phases. The Mission Planning System is responsible for configuring
and observing the other system entities based on the mission specific characteristics. These
four entities form a MCS chain that provides the main MCS functionality. To avoid single
points of failure this chain is replicated. As shown in the diagram a primary chain is active
during normal operation. In case of an error within the primary chain the complete chain
is passivated and a backup chain takes over operation through a warm passive failover. All
components of the backup chain are already deployed to take over operation as quickly as
possible. Only one chain at a time is allowed to send data through the NIS to the ground
stations.
The MCS is accessed by clients that allow mission operators to interact with the system
through a graphical user interface. Clients are always connected to one specific chain,
usually the primary MCS chain. In case of a failure the client also needs to failover to the
backup chain to ensure high availability for mission operators. Clients themselves are not
replicated and can be simply restarted.
In our case study three levels of replication granularity can be found:
1. no replication as in the case of the client components
2. replication of single components as for the NIS
3. replication of groups of components as in case of the MCS chains
CORFU incorporates techniques to achieve single component replications and based
on this component group replication.
27
V.2 Requirements for Component Group Failover
Providing a replication and recovery mechanism operating on component groups in-
cludes several requirements that need to be fulfilled. These requirements are (1) fault iso-
lation, (2) ensure fail-stop behavior of failed groups and (3) server recovery.
V.2.1 Requirement 1: Fault Isolation
Since faults are not recognizable directly they can only be isolated through detecting
occurring errors and reasoning about their cause. This then enables to predict which other
parts of the system will be affected by the same fault without having to wait for other errors
occurring. For component-based systems this includes determining if a failed component
or a group of components within a failed process have external dependencies that allow
the failure to propagate to other components. To provide fault isolation the fault tolerance
mechanism needs to determine which components are affected by a failure so that actions
can be taken to shield the system from this failure. This is hard since affected components
are possibly deployed across several server nodes. Component dependencies exist in many
forms, some being harder to detect and capture than others. They emanate from various
causes, such as shared operating system infrastructure, shared use of network resources,
middleware services and business logic dependencies.
Application in the MCS scenario: In the MCS scenario the reach of failure depen-
dencies differs among components. A client component has no failure dependencies and
can simply be restarted without affecting other system components. The NIS components
will not require other components to restart when they crash but the telecommand server
needs to be reconnected to the backup NIS. The components within one chain however are
dependent on each other. It is explicitly required that a failure occurring in one of these
Crash of the TM Server needs to result in marking all Chain A servers as failed. These
three cases need to be treated by middleware in different ways.
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V.2.2 Requirement 2: Ensure Fail-Stop Behavior
After a fault has been isolated by determining affected components it is necessary to
regard these components as containing inconsistent state. This is a threat to system consis-
tency since they possibly carry transient faults. As a consequence all affected components
need to be stopped as soon as possible. The time from error detection to the complete
stop of all affected components needs to be minimized. This is hard due to two factors:
(1) The time needed between detection of the first error and the effective shutdown of af-
fected components and (2) the need to synchronize the shutdowns between components in
a distributed environment.
Application in the MCS scenario: If a failure has been detected in the telemetry server
this could affect the other components in the chain and lead to inconsistency. The archive
might store data that is not correct and the telecommand server might issue commands
based on telemetry data that is no longer valid. Since the different components run on
different hosts, the shutdown process cannot happen instantaneously but will be affected
by the reaction time of the system algorithms and the communication capabilities of the
network.
V.2.3 Requirement 3 : Server Recovery
To achieve successful failover after a group of components has stopped it is necessary
to synchronize the activation of backup components. In a passive replication scheme this
mainly involves to coordinate which backup replicas become active. This is hard since
failover is done on a per component basis and each component possibly has several backup
replicas. To ensure consistent system state after failover it has to be made sure that all
backups that become active belong to the same failover group. Otherwise non-functional
requirements might not be met since two components that were not intended to work to-
gether are accidentally activated simultaneously.
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Application in the MCS scenario: When components of the primary chain fail and
get deactivated all components in the backup chain need to become active and take over the
role of the primary chain. In the presented scenario this is not likely, since there is only one
backup replica per component, namely telecommand server B, telemetry server B, mission
planning system B and archive B. However if a second backup chain C would be added
things become more complex. The system could end up having some components fail over
to replicas in chain C while others fail over to replicas in chain B. Components might be
deployed in a way that leads to resource overuse in case of unintended failover orderings.
The archive for example might need a reliable connection implemented as a real-time bus
system, that is only available within nodes of one chain and not between the telemetry
server node of chain B and the archive server node of chain C.
V.3 The CORFU Architecture
As motivated in the caste-study, component-based systems need fault-tolerance on a
higher level of abstraction than single distributed objects. CORFU therefore introduces
the concept of a failover unit (FOU) for component-based systems. The related modeling
concept of a failover unit is described in the context of the MDDPro modeling tool [14].
We use this concept and transfer it to component middleware.
A failover unit contains a set of components that are interdependent on each other with
respect to failure dependencies. This means that if one of the components fails, all compo-
nents of the unit need to fail as well. It thus enables fail-stop behavior for a whole unit.
CORFUs FOU concept is based on passive replication. One unit is declared to be the
primary unit. A primary unit actively processes requests and is made up of component
instances that are all primary replicas within their component replication group. Backup
FOUs are structurally identical to their corresponding primary FOU. This means that they
consist of component instances that have the same interfaces and connection structure as
their counterparts in the primary FOU. All component instances in the replica FOU are
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backup replicas within their component replication groups. Backup units are not necessar-
ily deployed on the same node constellation as the primary unit. It is possible to deploy all
backup unit elements on one server node even if the primary FOU is deployed on a set of
nodes.
Failover units can be described as a set of component instances that share a common
task and role. Their role is either to be a primary or a backup unit. Since it is possible to
have more than one backup for each FOU, each backup unit has a rank to determine the
order of failovers (e.g. the primary will fail over to backup FOU number one. If FOU one
fails afterwards, FOU two will become active and so on).
CORFU is implemented using the CORBA Component model as described in chap-
ter III.2.2. CORFUs architecture consists of several aspects that are presented here in
relation to the design challenges they address. Each challenge is presented together with
CORFUs design decisions to overcome it. The challenges presented are (1) single com-
ponent fault-tolerance, (2) integration into the deployment and configuration infrastructure
and (3) failover ordering of replicas.
V.3.1 Challenge 1 - Single Component Fault-Tolerance
Problem: Providing passive replication for components requires means to (1) group
components and treat them as replicas of one logical component instance, (2) a failover
mechanism to activate a backup replica in the case of an error and (3) a fault detection
mechanism that observes and reports when a system does not behave as expected.
In addition to this the nature of components add additional requirements for replica-
tion: (1) a component implementation can consist of several implementation artifacts that
need to be replicated, (2) components also have connections to other components that need
to be preserved during failover and (3) components are deployed in form of libraries that
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are dynamically loaded into the process space of some generic container. Component ini-
tialization and fault-tolerance configuration therefore needs to be done through dedicated
APIs.
Solution - Integrating FLARe through a fault-tolerant component server. FLARe
provides object level fault-tolerance and can be adapted to support component-based pas-
sive replication. As described in section III.2.1 process level fault detection is done trough
monitoring based on TCP/IP sockets. A failover mechanism based on ORB interceptors is
provided to groups replicas based on so called RankLists containing an ordered list of ob-
ject references. These references are associated with an object_id that identifies the logical
object the replicas are part of.
In addition to FLARes base functionality several adjustments have to be made to ad-
dress the additional requirements of component replication. This includes
1. Enhancing the notion of a Replication Group to Components
2. Preservation of Component Connections
3. Providing a Fault-Tolerant Component Server
V.3.1.1 Enhancing the notion of a Replication Group to Components
As described in section III.2.1 a replication group in FLARE is realized through a rank
list, that associates a group name with an ordered list of references. This list is cyclically
distributed to all clients that then use it to contact backup replicas for failovers. This so-
lution works on the level of single objects, since it uses object references within the rank
list.
Components however often consist of several objects. One servant represents the com-
ponent itself and each facet port and event sink are implemented by an additional servant.
For components to be replicated it is therefore necessary to create associations between
objects that form one component implementation.
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The most seamless approach here is to register each of the components implementa-
tion objects at component start-up using a specific naming scheme for replication groups.
The name of each object implementing a component aspect starts with the component in-
stances name followed by the actual name of the port name the object represents. Let’s
assume the MCS archive component has a port named “data” for data retrieval and a port
“mgnt” for administrative purposes. The replica group name of the main component object
would be “Archive”, and the port names for the two ports would be “Archive.data” and
“Archive.mgnt”. These names are used to register the objects with the component server
POA that has a USER_ID id assignment policy and it is added to each interoperable object
reference (IOR) of the objects through a server side portable interceptor. The same name
is also used to register the replicas with the ReplicationManager and the StateSynchroniza-
tionAgent.
V.3.1.2 Preservation of Component Connections
Component connections within the CORBA Component Model are realized by storing
object references to facet interfaces. These are registered with the context of each compo-
nent that uses the facet. A similar mechanism is used for event ports.
FLARe already provides functionality to distribute failover RankLists to clients that
then can perform failover functions. Since all facet objects are included in this list, connec-
tions are automatically kept valid: When a component tries to use a receptacle connected
to a facet object that is no longer accessible, it will automatically fail over to an appropriate
replica.
V.3.1.3 Providing a Fault-Tolerant Component Server
A component server is a generic process in the DAnCE infrastructure that hosts com-
ponent instances. The library containing the component implementation is loaded into the
process space of a component server by a DAnCE NodeApplication instance. A Container
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Figure V.2: Structural Overview of a Fault-Tolerant Component Server
is the run-time infrastructure within the component server that provides a component with
APIs to interact with this run-time. Based on XML meta-data the container will instantiate,
configure and start components.
To allow support for component-based fault-tolerance in CORFU, a fault-tolerant com-
ponent server has been developed. It includes all common functionality of a component
server and contains additional fault-tolerance functionality. Figure V.2 gives a structural
overview of the adjustments have been made to host fault-tolerant component replicas.
These can be summarized as follows:
1. Per-process initialization tasks, such as registration with the HostMonitor, initializa-
tion of the StateSynchronizationAgent and the ForwardingAgent and registration of
those with the ReplicationManager.
2. A fault-tolerant session container is instantiated that allows per component registra-
tion functionality such as POA registration, using the replica group id, embedding
of this id into each replica object reference and registering the component with the
ReplicationManager.
34
V.3.2 Challenge 2 - Integration into the Deployment and Configuration Infrastruc-
ture
Problem: The interfaces of the OMG Deployment and Configuration (D&C) Specifica-
tion as described in section III.2.3 are not providing fault-tolerance functionality. However
provisioning of fault-tolerance on groups of components requires to integrate into the sys-
tem model of the D&C infrastructure. CORFU needs to be standard compliant and yet
minimize performance overhead at run-time. This challenge includes the mapping of the
component deployment hierarchy to the FLARe system model hierarchy. While the D&C
model consists of nodes and components, FLARe uses a model that contains objects resid-
ing in processes that run on hosts. The second part of the challenge is integrate failover unit
related fault-tolerance properties into standard D&C deployment plans that do not have any
notion of replication.
The following partial solutions address this challenge:
1. Deployment Plan Preparation
2. Design of a FaultCorrelationManager
3. Mapping for FLARe and D&C System Models
V.3.2.1 Deployment Plan Preparation
For CORFU to be standard conform failover units need to be expressed through the
means available in the deployment plan specification of the OMG. A deployment plan is
static in nature. All component instances will be started together and are expected to op-
erate throughout the active phase of a deployment. Adding or removing particular compo-
nent instances during system lifetime is not supported by standard D&C interfaces. Since
Failover units need to be shut down prior to the shutdown of the whole system, CORFU
requires to split deployment plans into several sub-deployment plans based on failover in-
formation.
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CORFU provides the algorithm SPLIT-FOU (algorithm 1) that performs such deploy-
ment plan splits. The algorithm has to fulfill the following post conditions to achieve a
correct split.
1. Each failover unit needs to be represented by a separate deployment plan.
2. All component instances of the original plan must be contained within one of the sub
deployment plans.
3. Connections between component instances residing in different sub plans need to
be maintained by inserting external references and creating new connections among
them.
The algorithm has two input data structures: A deployment plan containing all compo-
nent instances and connections within a system and a failover unit specification that asso-
ciates instances in the deployment plan with failover units. By separating the declaration
of the failover units from the plan, these two aspects are made orthogonal. This allows to
define different fault-tolerance scenarios for one deployment plan and without modifying
the plan itself.
A deployment plan D is defined as < n,u,r, I,C >, where n is the string id of the plan,
u is the name of the failover unit, this plan represents, r is the rank for the failover order
of this plan, I is a list of all component instances in the deployment and C is a list of all
connections between two components within the deployment. Each instance Ii is defined
as < n,m >, where n is the name of the instance and m the name of the node an instance
is deployed on. Each connection Ci is an ordered pair of endpoints. Endpoints exist in
two forms: External endpoints ei refer to a connection outside of the current deployment
through a stringified path of the form <deployment id>/<instance id>/<port
id>. The other form are internal endpoints pi that refer to a component instance within the
current deployment through a path of the form <instance id>/<port id>. The first
element in the pair represents a component port that uses a service from another component,
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while the second entry provides the service. The failover unit declaration F is defined as
< n,u,r,J > where n is the concrete name of the failover unit, u is the group name of
failover units that are replicas of each other, r is the rank of the unit within its group and
J is the set of instance names from the deployment plan that are contained in this failover
unit.
The algorithm operates in two phases. The first phase will create a new deployment
plan for each failover unit and will will populate them with the correct instances. All com-
ponents that are not members of any failover unit are copied into an additional deployment
plan. In the second phase each connection is analysed. If both instances are still in the same
plan, it is simply copied into this sub-plan. Otherwise a connection to an external endpoint
referencing the correct component port is added to each of the two sub-plans that contain
these components now.
Algorithm 1 has a relatively high time complexity of O(n2log(n))+O(m∗n), where n
is the number of instances per plan and m the number of connections per plan. Since this is
an offline algorithm that is run before system deployment it does not need to be especially
optimized.
V.3.2.2 Design of a FaultCorrelationManager
CORFU introduces the FaultCorrelationManager (FCM) to manage fault-tolerance func-
tionality for failover units.
To integrate the FCM into the existing D&C infrastructure, the Decorator Pattern [6,
p.175] is applied. As shown in figure V.3 the FaultCorrelationManager implements the
ExecutionManager interface and can therefore be accessed by any service that uses the
ExecutionManager interface. The PlanLauncher that is responsible for passing deployment
plans to the ExecutionManager can now use this functionality.
In the context of the Decorator pattern, the FCM plays the role of a ConcreteDecorator
and the ExecutionManager is a ConcreteComponent. The Decorator Role in this case is
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Figure V.3: Application of the Decorator Pattern for the FaultCorrelationManager
design
not implemented as a class, but represented through the CORBA run-time that allows to
access the manager interface through an IOR. For the client it is transparent whether this
reference is pointing to a standard ExecutionManager or to a FaultCorrelationManager.
The FCM enhances the three methods of the interface with additional functionality.
Within these method implementations the calls are forwarded to the ExecutionManager.
The main tasks are performed at component deployment through the preparePlan
() method. This includes creating an internal representation of the complete system as
described in section V.3.2.3 and functionality to order per-component replica groups as
described in section V.3.3.
The algorithm SPLIT −FOU is not part of the functionality of the FCM. This is due
to the fact that the ExecutionManager interface allows access to each DomainApplication-
Manager and the user therefore needs to have complete knowledge about which deployment
plans are running. Creating deployment plans automatically would break this transparency.
However, it is envisioned to implement SPLIT-FOU in the context of a domain specific
modeling tool.
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Figure V.4: Structure of a Fault-Tolerant Component System
V.3.2.3 Mapping for FLARe and D&C System Models
In figure V.4 the structure of a deployed system is summarized. The ReplicationMan-
ager receives information about process failures from HostMonitors that are deployed on
each server. A HostMonitor observes all fault-tolerant processes of a system and reports the
process id to the ReplicationManager if a process crashes. The Replication system model
therefore contains hosts and processes running on these hosts. It also associates single ob-
jects with the process they are running on, which results in a three layer hierarchy including
hosts, processes and objects. A deployment plan has a two layer system model, with nodes
and components that are deployed on those nodes.
The ReplicationManager needs to report failures to the FCM. The FCM then determines
which other components to stop based on the failure. To achieve this, a mapping between
both hierarchies is needed so that the FCM can process failure information sent by the
ReplicationManager in the most efficient way.
The proposed mapping is structured as follows: As a basic design decision we chose
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to identify node names with host names. Every server in the system that is observed by
a HostMonitor will also represent exactly one node named after the network name of the
server machine. We furthermore annotate components in the deployment plan with a prop-
erty that identifies the replication group of component. This name is then passed to the
ReplicationManager on registration as object_id. Since an object_id represents a group of
replicated objects, it is still not guaranteed that a component is uniquely identified by tuple
of host name and object_id. Since it is not advisable to host several backup replicas of
the same object_id on the same physical host due to risk of loosing both replicas through a
crash of this server, it is appropriate to restrict the number of replicas per host and object_id
to one. This results in unique identification of components within one host.
Based on these decisions the following callback interface is implemented by the FCM
and registered with the ReplicationManager to receive notifications about process crashes.
typedef sequence<string> ApplicationList;
interface FaultNotification {
void app_failure (in string host,
in ApplicationList applications);
};
The ReplicationManager passes the host name of the crashed process as host parameter
and the FCM interprets it as node name. The applications parameter contains a list of
object_ids that were hosted in the crashed process. Note that the FCM does not need to
know in which processes a component is hosted in.
During deployment the FCM analyses the deployment plans to populate the following
data structures that help it to react on failure notifications:
1. A hash map I associates component instance names as keys with the id of the de-
ployment plan they are hosted in.
2. For each node a map O is maintained that uses the object_id as a key to find the
component instance name that is a local replica for this object_id on the node. These
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node maps themselves are stored within a hash map N that allows to find them by
using the node name as a key.
3. Each created DomainApplicationManager is stored in a map M with its deployment
plan id as key.
Based on these data structures reaction time on failure notifications is optimized since
all access times to these maps are small.
The algorithm 2 operates on these maps to process fault notifications during system
run-time. The processing is done in two phases. In phase one, all affected failover units,
represented as deployment plans are determined based on the failure information. This
phase uses the internal maps. The second phase uses exiting D&C infrastructure, namely
the DomainApplicationManagers to stop all component applications that belong to these
deployment plans.
V.3.3 Challenge 3 - Failover Ordering of Replicas
Problem: FLARe uses passive replication on a per-component basis. This means that
a backup replica takes over processing when the primary replica of a component fails.
For this purpose the ReplicationManager maintains a so called RankList for each fault-
tolerant object. The references within this list are sorted in the order in which they will
become active, starting with the first backup replica. Since the ReplicationManager has
no understanding of component groups it is hard to coordinate failovers across several
individual components. It has to be guaranteed that the failure of a primary failover leads
to the activation of all backup replicas in the next backup failover unit. It needs to be
prevented that component replicas from more than one backup failover unit are active at
the same time.
Solution - Failover Constraints. Our solution approach is to modify the Replication-
Managers algorithm such that it can process constraints. The per object order determined
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typedef sequence<string> HostList;
struct RankListConstraint
{
string object_id;
HostList hosts;
};
typedef sequence<RankListConstraint> RankListConstraints;
Figure V.5: IDL Declaration of RankList Constraints
by such constraints needs to be maintained. As shown in figure V.5, constraints are defined
as sequences of host-names associated with a replica object id. The first host list entry
indicates, where the primary is hosted and the following hosts contain backup component
replicas. Since every host only has one replica of the same group the constraint contains
enough information for the ReplicationManager to uniquely identify a replica.
The FaultCorrelationManager creates constraints based on information from the de-
ployment plan. Each deployment plan, representing a failover unit needs to be assigned a
rank within its group of failover unit replicas. The FOU-ORDERING algorithm for failover
unit based replica ordering is described in algorithm 3. All components within a unit will
be assigned the units rank. The constraints are updated using this algorithm whenever the
deployment changes. This happens if new deployment plans are loaded or when failures
occur and deployments are removed.
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Algorithm 1 SPLIT-FOU (D)
Data: A deployment plan D
Data: A failover unit definition F
Output: A set of deployment plans S
for each Fi ∈ F do
create new deployment plan s ∈ S;
set u of s to ui;
set name n of s to name(D)+name(Fi);
set rank r of s to ri of Fi;
for each Jk ∈ Fi do
find Il ∈ I | name(Il) = Jk;
copy Il to s;
mark Il as processed;
end
end
create new deployment plan s ∈ S;
for each unmarked component instance Ii ∈ D do
copy Ii to s;
end
for each Ci ∈ D do
p1 = first endpoint of Ci;
i1 = instance_id(p1);
find plan s1 ∈ S | i1 ∈ s1;
n1 = name(s1);
p2 = second endpoint of Ci;
i2 = instance_id(p2);
find plan s2 ∈ S | i2 ∈ s2;
n2 = name(s2);
if n1 = n2 then
copy Ci to s1;
else
create external endpoint e1 with path n2 + p2;
add connection < p1,e1 > to s1;
create external endpoint e2 with path n1 + p1;
add connection < e2, p2 > to s2;
end
end
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Algorithm 2 FAILURE-REACTION (h,F)
Input: host name h
Input: list of failed object ids F
Data: Component Instance Map I
Data: Node Map N
Data: DomainApplicationManager Map M
look up object_id map O with key h in N;
create empty set P of deployment plan names;
for each Fi ∈ F do
look up instance name i with key Fi in O;
look up plan name p with key i in I;
if p is not in P then
add p to P;
end
end
for each p ∈ P do
look up DomainApplicatonManager m with key p in M;
retrieve list of ApplicationManagers A through m.getApplications ();
for each NodeApplication a ∈ A do
call m.destroyApplication (a);
end
end
Algorithm 3 FOU-ORDERING
Data: List of deployment plans D
Output: A constraint list L
partially sort plans in D by their ranks;
for each plan d ∈ D do
for each instance i ∈ d do
get object_id o property from i;
get node name n property from i;
append n to list entry of L with object_id o;
end
end
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CHAPTER VI
RESULTS
CORFU provides advanced fault-tolerance capabilities for DRE systems. We evaluate
this claim using two different approaches. First, we do a conceptual analysis of the devel-
opment effort by comparing object-based development of fault-tolerant applications with
development using the CORFU infrastructure. Second, we present measurements of COR-
FUs’ timing behavior. These include measurements of client-side failover latency and of
the round-trip latency of failover unit fail-stop events.
VI.1 Benefits of Component-based Fault-Tolerance compared to Object Level
Fault-Tolerance
Developing applications that support distributed object-oriented fault-tolerance as pro-
vided by FLARe involves additional effort with respect to application development. This
evaluation qualifies those efforts and contrasts them with the component based fault-tolerance
approach CORFU provides.
Development obligations of object-oriented fault-tolerance: FLARe requires differ-
ent means to implement fault-tolerance on the server side, where the object to be replicated
resides, and on the client side, which uses replicated services. We will therefore separately
consider the obligations for server applications and client applications. We furthermore
distinguish between (1) object implementation obligations that each CORBA servant needs
to implement to integrate into the fault-tolerance infrastructure, (2) initialization obliga-
tions an application needs to perform to use FLARe functionality and (3) configuration
obligations at start-up that configure fault-tolerant aspects of the application.
Figure VI.1 gives an overview of all obligations related to server side development.
Each object implementation needs to provide callback interfaces to allow CHESS to do
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Figure VI.1: Development Obligations for Server-Side Fault-Tolerance
state synchronization. State synchronization additionally requires notification of the StateSyn-
chronizationAgent about state changes as discussed in chapter IV. Getter and setter meth-
ods have to be provided to give access to the supported replication object name and needed
agent references.
The main effort on the server side apart from object implementation is related to initial-
ization of the FLARe infrastructure. The server application developer needs to program-
matically perform the following tasks: An IOR interceptor has to be instantiated to allow
the annotation of exposed server object references with object id information. For the Host-
Monitor to observe a server application, a local thread has to be initialized. The application
then has to be registered with the monitor. The same procedure is necessary for a process
wide state synchronization agent. The agent needs to be instantiated and registered with the
ReplicationManager to receive information about other present object replicas. In addition
to these process wide initialization steps each object exposed by a server application needs
to be registered with the state synchronization agent and the ReplicationManager.
While the previously described steps need to be done programmatically, some aspects
need to be configured at application start-up time. This includes passing of the references to
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Figure VI.2: Development Obligations for Client-Side Fault-Tolerance
the ReplicationManager and the HostMonitor as well as the configuration of fault-tolerance
properties of the server objects, such as their role and the id of the logical object they
represent. This is either done through command line parameters or a proprietary file format
that is read by the application.
Figure VI.2 summarizes the obligations on the client side. Since FLARes architecture
provides a failover mechanism that is transparent to the client application as possible this
does not involve as many steps as server implementation. However there are still several
obligations that need to be performed correctly.
A client request interceptor needs to be initialized in order to transparently detect fail-
ures and forward requests to backup replicas. To inform the request interceptor about
available failover targets, a ForwardingAgent needs to be set up and registered with the
ReplicationManager. At start-up a client then must be configured with the object reference
of the ReplicationManager via command-line parameters or other means.
Consequences for application development: All the necessary obligations presented
here result in considerable accidental complexities in application and system development.
Being required to manually implement all initialization steps in clients and servers in-
creases the risk of accidentally omitting or confusing steps. This is even more problematic
since debugging of fault-tolerance aspects is hard due to its distributed nature.
In addition to these threats for quality and correctness, this approach also limits the
flexibility of system implementation. The number and type of object replicas per server
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process are determined by manually written code. This means that any change in position-
ing of replicas in the system is limited. Either each object needs to be reside in a separate
application to allow flexible positioning on replicas on according hosts. This however in-
curs additional resource consumption related to FLARes’ infrastructure. The alternative is
to collocate several objects which requires the adaption of application code. This increases
the time needed to adapt a system to new requirements and thus complicates system evolu-
tion.
Benefits of CORFUs’ component-based approach: By integrating FLARe function-
ality into a fault-tolerant component server, CORFU overcomes many of these limitations
of traditional object-oriented fault-tolerance approaches. Server and client side capabil-
ities are available within the same component server. Since CORBA objects often play
both roles of server and client at the same time this is a suitable architectural decision. We
present the benefits of the component server approach by relating them to the three different
types of obligations as presented earlier.
1. Object Implementation: Component executors, being the concrete implementation
artifact of a component interfaces technically are CORBA servants. They therefore
have to fulfill the same obligations as in the object-oriented case. However CCM
provides code generation functionality in the form of the IDL and CIDL compilers
that automatically can create necessary code artifacts.
2. Initialization: Most of the steps of client and server initialization can be done au-
tomatically. Instantiation of the state synchronization agent, the ForwardingAgent
and the HostMonitor thread are not related to hosted objects. The fault-tolerant com-
ponent server, therefore, hides the complexity of initializing these entities from the
component developer. The registration of individual components with the framework
also can be done automatically by a fault-tolerance aware session container. The nec-
essary information, such as the role and object id of a component can be submitted
using configuration attributes provided in the deployment plan specifications.
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3. Configuration: Instead of using proprietary mechanisms on a per-application level
the component server approach enables the use of standardized configuration mecha-
nism provided by the D&C specification. Special fault-tolerant component attributes
can be defined and initialized within the deployment plan through so called con-
figuration properties. This still leaves the obligation to configure these properties.
But instead of doing this in scripts in the form of command line parameters or us-
ing proprietary solutions that might even vary from application to application, this
standardized approach uses existing infrastructure to actually instantiate the system.
Conclusion: CORFU increases the transparency of using fault-tolerance mechanisms
for server development as well as for client development. This allows for the application
developer to focus on business logic implementation while fault tolerance aspects can be
added and configured orthogonally. It is possible to collocate fault-tolerant components
without changing their implementation code. CORFU therefore also substantially improves
the flexibility of system deployment and system evolution. In addition to that there are
fewer possibilities of accidental faults in application development, since the initialization
is done in a well tested and stable way by the component server.
VI.2 Experimental Results
This section presents experiments that evaluate the timing behavior of CORFU. These
experiments allow a better understanding of latencies involved in the failover mechanisms
and clarifies for which timing requirements CORFU is sufficient. The first experiment
evaluates failover latency as experienced by a client application. The second one focuses
on timing latency of the coordinated shutdown of a failover unit.
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Figure VI.3: Experiment Setup for Failover Latency Measurement
VI.2.1 Testbed
All experiments have been conducted on ISISLab1, a LAN virtualization environment
with identical blades connected through 4 Gbps switches that allow for dedicated links
per experiment. The blades each have two 2.8GHz Xeon CPUs and 1 gigabyte RAM.
The Fedora Core 6 Linux distribution rt11 real-time kernel patches is used as operating
system. The enhancements to FLARe and the CORFU implementation are based on TAO
version 1.6.8 a real-time CORBA implementation and CIAO version 0.6.8, which is an
implementation of the CORBA component model. CORFU and all testing applications
have been built using the GNU compiler collection gcc version 3.4.6.
VI.2.2 Failover Latency
Experiment Setup: This experiment compares the failover latency a client experiences
for CORBA 2.x applications and component-based applications.
Figure VI.3 shows the basic setup of the experiments. A client application periodically
calls a server application that is replicated. The period is 200 milliseconds and the execu-
tion time of each task is 20 milliseconds. We used a CPU worker component of the system
execution modeling tool CUTS[2] that allows to simulate a defined processing time in mil-
lisecond accuracy. With each call the server sends back the actual time from the beginning
1http://www.isislab.vanderbilt.edu
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of processing the request to the end of processing. This can be more than the 20 millisec-
onds since the process might be preempted by other processes on the same host. The client
also measures the time from issuing the request on the server until it receives a response.
By subtracting the server side processing time from the measured response time, the time
for communication can be calculated.
After a defined number of calls the server will simulate a fault by shutting down. This
causes the client to fail over to the backup replica of the server. At this moment the response
time in the client is expected to increase due to the fact that the connection error has to be
detected and a new connection to the backup replica is established.
All primary servers are hosted on one host, the backup servers are hosted on a separate
host. The clients also a deployed together on a dedicated host and all CORFU infrastructure
entities, such as the ReplicationManager and the D&C run-time are hosted separately to not
interfere with the timing measurements.
This setup has been implemented in two variants. Variant 1 is object-oriented and
consists of a client and a server executable that directly use FLARe functionality. Variant
two is component-based and uses CORFUs’ fault-tolerant component server. Each variant
is used in three different experiment configurations. Configuration one runs one group
of client, primary replica and backup replace, configuration two runs two such groups in
parallel and configuration three has four applications that operate at the same time. Each
measurement configuration is repeated 100 times and the average is used for the evaluation.
Measurement Results: An example for a single measurement for failover latency is
given in figure VI.4 (1), which represents the component-based case with one application
set running. The ten invocations before and after a failure event are recorded. The first
10 invocations show a communication overhead between zero and one milliseconds, which
represents failure free communication with the primary server. On the clients attempt to
contact the server at invocation eleven the failover occurs since the server shut down after
ten invocations. In this case the latency increases to four milliseconds due to the processing
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time within the ORB to detect the CORBA exception indicating the servers unresponsive-
ness and the forwarding of the request to the backup replica.
Figure VI.4: Failover Latency Measurements
Figure VI.4 (2) shows the average latencies as measured in all six configurations. The
three CORBA 2.x based object-oriented experiment with one application shows a commu-
nication overhead of three three milliseconds, while the corresponding component-based
experiment has a latency of four milliseconds. This shows that the extra cost for the
component-based fault-tolerance with 25 percent additional overhead is relatively small.
Looking at the configurations with two and four applications we can see that the component-
based experiments stay constant around four milliseconds of latency, while the object-
oriented examples have growing response times. This is not directly related to the failover-
mechanism but reflects the implicit differences between the experiment variants, since the
executables start processing right away while a component is first loaded into the container
and then triggered later on to start processing. Nevertheless the results show that there is
no unreasonably high overhead for component based fault-tolerance.
VI.2.3 Failover Unit Shutdown Latency
Experiment Setup: The second experiment is designed to give insight into the latency
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involved in the process of shutting down a failover unit. This latency is due to several
factors:
1. Error detection and notification delay from the failure of a component to the start of
processing its notification by the FCM
2. Reaction delay within the FCM to determine which components are affected and
which deployments therefore need to be shut down
3. Shutdown time using the D&C services, namely the DomainApplicationManager and
it’s node application interfaces to destroy the affected node applications.
The structure of the experiment and its logical sequence of events is shown in figure VI.5.
The setup includes six processing nodes of which one node is dedicated for the CORFU
management entities, such as the ReplicationManager, the FCM, the ExecutionManager
and other elements of the D&C run-time. The other five nodes have a HostMonitor de-
ployed to observer the system state per node. Each node hosts one component for each of
five deployed failover unit. There is one primary failover unit that includes one component
per node, named A0 to E0. This failover unit is replicated four times through the backup
failover units one through four. Each of the backup units contains replica components An
to En of each component in the primary unit. The failover order of the units corresponds to
their number. The experiment will inject failures in the currently active component, leading
to a failover sequence of primary FOU, backup FOU 1, backup FOU 2, backup FOU 3 and
finally backup FOU 4. Each experiment run therefore allows us to measure four failover
latencies.
Due to the need for consistent time, all measurements are taken on node-1 in the Repli-
cationManager and the FaultCorrelationManager. This prevents the need for synchronized
clocks. The measurements are done in the following sequence:
1. A failure is provoked in component An of the active FOU.
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Figure VI.5: Experiment Setup for Failover Unit Shutdown Latency Measurement
2. The failure is detected by the HostMonitor and reported to the ReplicationManager.
3. The ReplicationManager takes a time-stamp at time t1 when it receives the failure
notification and notifies the FCM about the occurred failure. The FCM takes a times
tamp at time t2 when it is notified about a failure.
4. The FCM does look-up operations in its internal maps to determine which FOU
deployment plans need to be shut down and takes a time-stamp t3 after finishing
this look-up.
5. The FCM will then access the DomainApplicationManager to retrieve all node appli-
cations for the corresponding deployment plans and then will iterate through them to
shut them down. After the last call is returning, a time-stamp at t4 is taken to indicate
the finishing of the shutdown request.
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6. The ReplicationManager will be notified about all the shutdowns of the affected com-
ponents by the HostMonitors. On reception of the last shutdown notification, a time-
stamp for t5 is taken that represents the time when the FOU is completely shut down
and a client would failover to a backup replica no matter which component in the
FOU it tries to access.
Measurement Results: The measured times allow us to determine the following la-
tency times:
Round-trip Time tround-trip = t5− t1 (VI.1)
The round-trip time is the sum of all latencies involved in the shutdown of a failover unit.
This includes failure detection, reaction time within the FCM and shutdown time by the
D&C run-time.
Reaction Time treaction = t3− t2 (VI.2)
The reaction time is the time spent within the FCM between the failure notification and the
start of the shutdown process. This basically is the time needed to perform the FAILURE-
REACTION algorithm 2 and to serialize incoming notifications into a thread-safe queue to
ensure correct processing of parallely detected errors.
Shutdown Time tshutdown = t4− t3 (VI.3)
The shutdown time as measured by the FCM allows us to get an understanding which
proportion of tround-trip is not related to the D&C shutdown mechanism which cannot be
changed without breaking the standard.
Figure VI.6 shows minimum, maximum and average round-trip and shutdown laten-
cies for fail-stop measurements. Reaction latencies have not been displayed since they are
negligible compared to the other types of latency.
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Figure VI.6: Measurement results for fail-stop latencies
As we can see from the graph, CORFU has the following latency characteristics:
Average Latency Time ¯tround-trip = 70.59ms (VI.4)
of which the shutdown time represents a huge proportion although it does not fluctuate as
much.
Average Shutdown Time ¯tshutdown = 56.04ms (VI.5)
For the internal reaction time of the FCM, experiments show that is no crucial factor in
timing behavior:
Average Reaction Time ¯treaction = 0.24ms (VI.6)
VI.2.4 Discussion
Based on the experiments we performed several characteristics of CORFU are exposed.
Using a client-side failover mechanism allows for short failover latencies, since communi-
cation with the central replication manager in the instant of a failure is avoided. This would
be a bottleneck in performance of large-scale systems. As shown by the first experiment,
this client side failover latency is relatively small, being three milliseconds for the object
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variant. Having evaluated the benefits for CORFU concerning application development and
system deployment we also needed to ensure that this does not drastically degrade perfor-
mance and therefore render the solution unusable for DRE applications. As our experiment
shows, client failover in CORFU is comparable in performance and occurs only minimal
overhead, having an average response time of four milliseconds.
Compared to the client failover latency the failover unit shutdown latency with 70 mil-
liseconds in average is relatively high. The reason for this is partly to be found in the
iterative way a deployment has to be shutdown based on the domain application and node
application interfaces. Another source of long response times is the communication time
between the different entities, such as the HostMonitors, the ReplicationManager and the
FCM. The internal reaction time of the FCM to determine deployments that are affected
by faults is already optimized through the use of hash maps with close to constant access
times. With an average beneath 0.25 milliseconds it does not substantially contribute to the
overall processing time.
Based on these sources of overhead, we envision three approaches to reduce the round-
trip latency for failover unit shutdown:
Parallelized Shutdown To reduce the shutdown latency the calls initializing shutdowns
for affected node applications can be parallelized instead of being done in sequential
order. A suitable mechanism to do so is Asynchronous Method Invocation as defined
in the CORBA standard. This allows the FCM as a client to issue all shutdown
requests without having to wait for their response in between. This would lead to
significant reduction of the shutdown time, especially in large deployments.
Collocation of Management Entities Some communication paths, especially between Repli-
cationManager, FCM and ExecutionManager can be optimized by collocating these
entities into the same process space. This greatly reduces communication times since
the network stack can be avoided and in process communication mechanisms are
used instead.
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RTCORBA For the communication paths that need to go through the network, commu-
nication can be made more reliable and deterministic by using RTCORBA features,
such as the real-time scheduling service, private connections, pre-allocation of con-
nections and end-to-end priorities.
Although there still is potential for performance improvement, the measurements show
that CORFU is suitable for DRE systems and offers comparable performance to distributed
object-oriented fault-tolerance.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Research on fault-tolerant DRE systems often has focused on solutions that simply
focus on the fault tolerance related aspects of a system. Application development effort
and system evolution often is not taken into account. Existing frameworks mostly use an
object-oriented paradigm to provide fault-tolerance.
Our work shows that applying the component-based development paradigm can im-
prove transparency of fault tolerance aspects in the application development process and
therefore fosters more flexible system structures and better support for system evolution.
We showed how this approach also increases the speed and quality of application develop-
ment. Through measurements of the CORFU infrastructure we showed that component-
based fault-tolerance can be provided within required performance limits.
VII.1 Lessons Learned
Through our work on component-based fault-tolerance for distributed real-time and
embedded systems we gained a better understanding of the domain, which is summarized
in the following lessons learned:
1. Fault Tolerance affects all aspects of a system and introduces a new dimension of
complexity. It is therefore hard to capture all fault tolerance aspects in a comprehen-
sive middleware framework. Application characteristics differ greatly even within
the DRE domain, which affects used protocols, architectural concepts applied and
technologies chosen. Each of these choices might require different approaches to
fault-tolerance.
59
2. Development of fault tolerant systems can benefit greatly from integration into mid-
dleware. Although there is no one-size-fits-all solution central fault-tolerance aspects
can be captured in frameworks through intelligent design approaches. CHESS is an
example that uses design patterns to separate application specific concerns from com-
mon fault-tolerance mechanisms and thus increases the level of automation of replica
state synchronization.
3. Component-based Middleware allows for greater fault-tolerance transparency. As
demonstrated by CORFUs’ fault-tolerant component server, the component-based
development paradigm and lightweight fault-tolerance integrate very well, allowing
the hiding of much complexity that exists in this domain.
4. Layering and separation of concerns fosters flexible and architectures. This becomes
clear in the design of the fault correlation manager. By building the failover units on
top of the existing object based approach and separating concerns through failover
constraints, the fault correlation manager design and implementation could be kept
small and focused on its main task to analyze the system infrastructure and react
on failures using other existing software, namely the deployment and configuration
infrastructure.
5. Performance of Fault Tolerance is hard to measure due to singular nature of failures,
non-determinism in network, operating system and middleware. Since faults are no
periodical events in systems expecting fail-stop behavior the setup of experiments
is complex. Each measurement can only measure a very limited number of faults
before the complete system has to be restarted. Additionally the nature of distributed
systems makes it hard to gather reliable timing information due to network jitter,
operating system scheduling and other sources of non-determinism. Experiments
and testing scripts need to be highly automated to allow a sufficient number of single
measurements.
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VII.2 Future Work
The work on CORFU touched on many aspects of fault-tolerance in the context of com-
ponent based system. Future work in this area needs to be done to achieve a comprehensive
solution that integrates all aspects of fault-tolerance and component-based software devel-
opment.
• Optimization of Group Failover in the Fault Correlation Manager and DAnCE:
As discussed in the experimental results section, failover latency of failover units
needs to be optimized.
• Transactions within and across Failover Units for advanced state consistency
guarantees: So far, CHESS provides consistency mechanisms on the level of sin-
gle components. Certain applications require consistency guarantees for groups of
components, such as failover units. Transactional semantics need to be introduced to
enforce stronger guarantees of consistency.
• Extending the Fault Model to Network Failures: DRE systems might need to
operate in environments with highly unreliable communication channels. In such
scenarios fault models need to include network failures as well as host and process
failures. Further research has to be done to enhance FLARe and CORFU to deal
with partitioning in networks and reconciliation of state and failover information
after reestablishment of connectivity.
• Integration of CORFU with Domain Specific Modeling tools, such as MDDPro [14]:
CORFU provides a run-time solution for groups of components with fault dependen-
cies. To integrate these concepts into a domain specific modeling language allows
for a comprehensive engineering approach to fault-tolerance. The SPLIT-FOU algo-
rithm in particular integrates well into a modeling environment and eases the burden
of the system deployment planner.
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• Additional Fault Tolerance Aspects for Component Deployment Infrastructures:
To avoid single points of failure, all entities in a component based run-time system
need to be fault-tolerant. Further research needs to be done to apply object-based
fault-tolerance to entities such as the execution manager, the node managers and
other D&C entities as well as to the fault correlation manager itself.
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